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Historians	  of	  psychiatry	  and	  crime	  are	  familiar	  with	  the	  fraught	  cases	  of	  parents	  who	  
murdered	  their	  children,	  or	  men	  and	  women	  who	  murdered	  their	  spouse,	  who	  were	  
subsequently	  found	  insane	  and	  committed	  to	  an	  asylum	  such	  as	  Broadmoor.	  Questions	  
about	  what	  constituted	  insanity	  in	  medico-­‐legal	  discourse,	  the	  role	  of	  the	  medical	  
witness	  in	  insanity	  trials,	  and	  the	  increasing	  acceptance	  of	  homicidal	  mania	  in	  insanity	  
cases,	  drive	  Mad-­‐Doctors	  in	  the	  Dock,	  which	  completes	  Joel	  P.	  Eigen’s	  three-­‐volume	  
survey	  of	  all	  insanity	  trials	  held	  at	  the	  Old	  Bailey	  between	  1760	  and	  1913.1	  Founded	  
upon	  almost	  1000	  Old	  Bailey	  Sessional	  Papers,	  this	  meticulously	  researched	  book	  adds	  
to	  our	  understandings	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  medical	  and	  legal	  conceptions	  of	  
insanity,	  and	  authority	  in	  the	  courtroom.	   	  
	   Medical	  men	  increasingly	  participated	  in	  trials	  between	  1760	  and	  1913.	  This,	  
Eigen	  observes,	  was	  facilitated	  by	  the	  adoption	  of	  defense	  lawyers	  -­‐	  who	  could	  call	  
medical	  witnesses	  –	  combined	  with	  the	  State’s	  placement	  of	  medical	  men	  into	  police	  
stations	  and	  prisons	  over	  the	  nineteenth	  century.	  Defendants	  were	  thus	  more	  likely	  to	  
encounter	  potential	  medical	  witnesses.	  Consequently,	  who	  gave	  medical	  testimony	  
changed	  over	  time:	  the	  defendant’s	  neighbours	  or	  private	  surgeon,	  who	  might	  have	  
described	  his	  usual	  behavior	  in	  earlier	  trials,	  were	  displaced	  by	  police	  or	  prison	  
surgeons	  who	  could	  to	  testify	  to	  his	  health	  and	  demeanour	  shortly	  after	  the	  crime.	  Eigen	  
highlights	  that	  it	  was	  these	  non-­‐experts,	  rather	  than	  eminent	  alienists	  (psychiatrists),	  
who	  provided	  the	  bulk	  of	  medical	  opinion	  in	  insanity	  cases.	  Eigen	  traces	  the	  
development	  of	  the	  medical	  profession,	  observing	  that,	  particularly	  before	  the	  1850s,	  
these	  practitioners	  had	  gained	  their	  expertise	  through	  experience	  with	  patients	  and	  
prisoners	  rather	  than	  education	  and	  training.	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   When	  taking	  the	  stand	  medical	  witnesses	  had	  to	  persuade	  juries	  that	  they	  were	  
better	  able	  to	  identify	  insanity	  than	  the	  jury	  themselves.	  They	  emphasised	  that	  their	  
experience	  of	  dealing	  with	  numerous	  prisoners	  or	  patients	  enabled	  them	  to	  distinguish	  
between	  sanity,	  insanity,	  feigning,	  and	  temporary	  insanity,	  the	  latter	  being	  particularly	  
troublesome	  to	  laymen.	  They	  also	  stressed	  their	  ability	  to	  establish	  the	  existence	  of	  
delusions.	  	   	  
	   Delusions	  were	  judges	  preferred	  evidence	  of	  insanity	  throughout	  the	  period,	  and	  
the	  most	  frequent	  medico-­‐legal	  term	  in	  medical	  testimony.	  Some	  medical	  witnesses	  
actively	  incorporated	  legal	  understandings	  into	  their	  testimony.	  Yet	  even	  after	  the	  
McNaughton	  Rules	  of	  1843,	  others	  continued	  to	  challenge	  legal	  understandings	  of	  
insanity	  by	  proffering	  diagnoses	  in	  which	  the	  accused	  was	  not	  thought	  to	  be	  deluded	  
but	  did	  not	  know	  the	  character	  of	  their	  actions	  or	  intend	  to	  cause	  harm,	  such	  as	  moral	  
insanity	  and	  irresistible	  impulses.	  Such	  explanations	  –	  which	  minimized	  defendants’	  
potential	  to	  exercise	  volition	  -­‐	  were	  initially	  given	  short	  shrift.	  Yet	  from	  the	  1860s,	  when	  
greater	  emphasis	  was	  placed	  on	  physical	  causes	  of	  insanity	  and	  amid	  broader	  societal	  
concerns	  of	  degeneration,	  judges	  accepted	  diagnoses	  that	  explained	  behavior	  as	  the	  
result	  of	  uncontrollable	  impulse	  rather	  than	  defective	  cognition	  or	  delusions.	  This	  is	  
best	  illustrated	  by	  the	  increasing	  acceptance	  of	  diagnoses	  of	  homicidal	  mania;	  it	  
appeared	  in	  43	  Old	  Bailey	  cases	  between	  1857	  and	  1913.	  Although	  sometimes	  paired	  
with	  delusions	  or	  suspended	  consciousness,	  homicidal	  mania	  explained	  murder	  as	  the	  
result	  of	  an	  uncontrollable	  impulse;	  judges	  accepted	  that	  the	  will	  was	  not	  necessarily	  
controllable.	  Moreover,	  the	  act	  could	  be	  the	  only	  evidence	  of	  the	  impulse,	  and	  thus	  the	  
insanity;	  the	  crime	  explained	  the	  crime.	  	  	  
	   The	  State’s	  patronage	  of	  mental	  medicine	  and	  installation	  of	  medical	  care	  into	  
the	  prison	  and	  judicial	  systems	  created	  circumstances	  whereby	  medical	  men	  could	  gain	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experience	  and	  claim	  expertise.	  That	  expertise	  was	  given	  public	  acknowledgement	  by	  
their	  role	  as	  medical	  witnesses.	  Yet,	  Eigen	  convincingly	  shows	  they	  were	  unable	  to	  
impose	  ideas	  upon	  the	  court.	  Judges	  could	  direct	  juries	  to	  reach	  particular	  verdicts,	  and	  
shaped	  the	  reception	  and	  scope	  of	  medical	  testimony.	  Eigen	  argues	  that	  the	  judiciary’s	  
initial	  tendency	  to	  dismiss	  diagnoses	  involving	  irresistible	  impulses	  was	  exceptional;	  
they	  did	  not	  wish	  to	  challenge	  the	  authority	  of	  medical	  witnesses	  or	  of	  psychiatry.	  They	  
were	  inquisitive	  more	  often	  than	  dismissive,	  and	  could	  ask	  questions	  designed	  to	  
ensure	  defendants	  benefitted	  from	  medical	  testimony.	  Witnesses	  were	  challenged	  and	  
pushed	  to	  speak	  to	  the	  issue	  of	  defective	  cognition	  and	  the	  accused’s	  understanding	  of	  
right	  and	  wrong	  but	  this	  resulted	  from	  the	  necessity	  to	  make	  medical	  testimony	  speak	  
to	  the	  legal	  needs	  of	  the	  court	  and	  to	  focus	  juries	  on	  guilt	  fastening.	  Trial	  narratives	  
sometimes	  reveal	  medicine	  and	  law	  collaborating	  to	  reach	  what	  they	  felt	  was	  the	  ‘right’	  
outcome.	  Still,	  medical	  testimony	  did	  not	  consistently	  determine	  verdicts.	  Reflecting	  on	  
the	  impossibility	  of	  establishing	  why	  juries	  reached	  particular	  verdicts,	  Eigen	  highlights	  
juries	  were,	  in	  essence,	  a	  law	  unto	  themselves.	  	  
Eigen’s	  findings	  will	  be	  of	  great	  interest	  to	  scholars	  of	  the	  histories	  of	  crime,	  
insanity,	  medicine,	  and	  jurisprudence.	  
	  
